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Standard and Nonstandard Work 
Arrangements, Pay Difference, 
and Choice of Work 
by Japanese Mothers
Nobuko Nagase  
Ochanomizu University
In this chapter, we analyze two questions.  First, how do marriage
and children affect women’s choices among full-time regular employ-
ment and part-time employment and no work; and do they differ by
cohorts and by the educational attainment of females?  Second, why is
the part-time employment wage so low in Japan, and why do increas-
ingly more females still choose to work part-time?
The age profile of female labor participation still retains an M-
shape in Japan: labor force participation rises at first with age, declines
during women’s childbearing years, and rises again with age until
retirement ages.  In contrast, in the United States, the United Kingdom,
Germany, France, and in many other western countries, the profile has
slowly changed to a high plateau over the last 20–30 years.  Has the
work behavior also changed for the younger cohorts in Japan?  To
address this question we use microdata from the Eleventh Japanese
National Fertility Survey–Married Wife, collected by the National
Institute of Population and Social Security Research in 1997.  To
explore the second question of why the wage level of part-time work-
ers remained low despite the general increase in demand for part-time
workers, and the increase in part-time work, we use the Survey on the
Diversified Workers at Workplace, conducted by the Japan Labor Insti-
tute in 1999.  The chapter attempts to show what effects the tax and
social security system had, together with labor practices, in keeping the
part-time wage rate low. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows.  We first report the general
time trends of Japanese female labor using descriptive statistics.  In
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contrast to other western countries reviewed in this volume, many mar-
ried females have worked as informal family workers in the past.  The
emerging part-time employment opportunities coincided with the
decline in informal work opportunities in the 1980s.  Part-time employ-
ment further increased among unmarried females, the aged, and young
males in the 1990s.  We then examine specific features of Japanese
nonstandard work, its definition, and time trends in wage levels.  In the
third section, we analyze the important policy changes in recent years
that have strongly influenced women.  Although the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Law and Child Care Leave Law promoted equality
between the sexes and continued labor force participation, the tax and
social security reform encouraged wives to remain as secondary earn-
ers, especially in part-time work.  These early sections, therefore, offer
general and up-to-date information concerning female labor in Japan.
In the fourth section, we examine marriage and childbirth and the
mother’s choice of no work, regular work, or nonstandard work using
descriptive statistics and multinomial logit analysis of microdata.
Although the younger generations are more likely to continue to work
after marriage, the majority of women still quit work after the birth of
their first child.  The less educated are more likely to return to non-
standard work arrangements.  The more educated may have a higher
attachment to work during child-rearing years, but they are less likely
to return to work once they interrupt their first career.  In the following
section, the wage structure of nonstandard employees is estimated, and
the effect of the tax and social security tax system on wage is dis-
cussed.  The chapter ends with concluding remarks.
GROWTH OF NONSTANDARD WORKERS
Japan perhaps contrasts with other countries in this volume in that
about 40 percent of all married female labor participants were in self-
employment as late as the 1980s.  Self-employment includes family
workers or the self-employed in small family-owned stores, small fam-
ily-run manufacturing, or in agriculture.  Table 8.1 shows that part-time
and other nonstandard employment rapidly replaced self-employ-
ment.  In 1987, self-employment comprised 36 percent of the married
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female labor force, and nonstandard work comprised 26 percent; in
1997, the percentage was just about the opposite, 26 percent for the
former and 35 percent for the latter.  Table 8.1 also shows that the per-
centage of such nonstandard employment and informal sector work
was much lower for males and for females, if unmarried females are
included. 
Because the increase in part-time employment offsets the decline
in informal sector work, Nitta (2001) attributes the increase in part-
time work to supply-side matters. Indeed, many married women chose
this form of work to better coordinate household chores and market
work.  According to the Statistics Office Basic Employment Survey,
the percentage of workers who replied that they are “mainly working”









1982 79 22 78 66 2 4
1987 77 20 80 67 3 3
1997 76 16 84 68 5 3
Female
1982 49 34 66 43 17 3
1987 48 30 70 43 22 3
1997 50 20 80 43 30 4
Married 
femalef
1982 44 42 58 32 20 3
1987 50 36 63 31 26 3
1997 51 26 74 32 35 3
a As a percentage of all employed. Dependent employment = Seishain (regular work-
ers) + Part-time + Others + Executives of corporations. 
b As a percentage of working-age population.
c As a percentage of all employed. Self-employed includes family workers.
d Part-time includes arubaito.
e Others include dispatched workers and shokutaku.
f Spouse of household heads in an ordinary household.
SOURCE: Statistics Office Basic Employment Survey.
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remained at about one-fourth of all married females throughout the
1980s and 1990s, despite the rise in the labor participation rate.  On the
other hand, those who replied that they are “working as secondary
activities” increased from 20 percent to 25 percent of married females.
Tables 8.2 and 8.3 show how women’s work choices differ by fam-
ily characteristics.  Table 8.2 shows that single women have a high
labor force participation rate, at around 90 percent, and also have a
high share of regular full-time work (around 80 percent) for the 25–34
Table 8.2 Labor Force Participation: Single Women and Married Women 
without Children
Age
Total 15–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+
Single women
Population size (in 10,000) 758 104 114 47 61 90 342
Labor participation rate (%) 45 60 94 91 85 56 9
Wage and salaried earners to 
labor force participants (%)
88 98 94 93 84 83 50
Nonagricultural wage and 
salaried earners (%)a
Regular employees 68 64 80 75 67 47 38
Part-time and arubaito 28 34 14 19 31 45 54
Dispatched workers 2 0 3 3 0 3 –
Shokutaku and others 3 2 3 6 3 5 8
Married women (with no
children or other relatives
in household)
Population size (in 10,000) 996 14 164 78 152 294 311
Labor participation rate (%) 43 50 65 65 64 45 15
Wage and salaried earners to
labor force participants (%)
72 100 94 85 74 63 30
Nonagricultural wage and 
salaried earnersa (%)
Regular employees 47 57 56 49 46 38 43
Part-time and arubaito 46 27 35 46 50 58 50
Dispatched workers 2 0 4 2 1 0 –
Shokutaku and others 5 0 6 5 4 5 14
a Percentage may not add up to 100 because of rounding.
SOURCE: Labor Force Special Survey 2001 and 2000.
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Table 8.3 Labor Participation Pattern, Married Women by Age of Children
Age of the youngest child No. of children
0–3 4–6 7–9 10–12 13–14 15–17 18+ 1 2 3+
Population size (in 10,000) 326 166 141 140 101 173 701 774 735 239
Labor participation: nuclear family (%) 28 46 62 63 71 69 56 47 54 54
Labor participation: extended family (%) 40 63 79 78 81 81 71 67 70 74
Nuclear/all families (%) 85 79 76 71 69 72 83 85 77 70
For married women of nuclear families
Percentage of total populationa
     Regular employees 12 15 13 16 19 18 15 15 14 13
     Part-time and arubaito 8 21 32 34 36 38 25 20 28 27
     Dispatched workers 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
     Shokutaku and others 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2
Percentage of labor force participants
     Regular employees 44 33 23 26 27 26 27 32 27 23
     Part-time and arubaito 32 47 55 55 52 57 45 42 52 49
     Dispatched workers 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
     Shokutaku and others 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
Percentage of nonagricultural wage and 
salaried workers
     Regular employees 55 40 28 31 33 31 36 42 33 30
     Part-time and arubaito 40 57 68 65 64 67 61 55 64 64
     Dispatched workers 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
     Shokutaku and others 3 2 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 4
a Percentages do not add up to labor force participation rate because informal sector work is not included.
SOURCE: Labor Force Special Survey, February 2001.
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age group.  The labor force participation rate of married women with-
out children drops by 20 to 30 percentage points and the share of non-
standard employment (part-time, dispatched, shokutaku, and others)
increases to nearly half of those employed.  Table 8.3 shows the work
patterns for mothers by the age of their youngest child.  The second and
third rows show that the labor participation rate is about 10–17 per-
centage points lower for nuclear families than for extended families.
Because nuclear families compose around 80 percent of families with
children today, the middle and lower sections of the table show the
work categories in detail for nuclear families. 
The participation rate drops to 28 percent for the nuclear family
when the youngest child is under age 3; it rises to 71 percent when the
youngest child is 13–14 years old. The share of regular workers to total
population stays relatively stable: 12 percent when the youngest child
is age 0–3 and 18 percent when the youngest child is 15–17.  On the
other hand, the share of nonstandard employment to the total popula-
tion increases as children age, from 8 percent of families whose young-
est child is 0–3 to 38 percent when the youngest child is age 15–17. 
Interestingly, as Table 8.2 reveals, the ratio of women who work in
nonstandard employment generally increases with age for both single
and married women.  This indicates that the choice is not only a desire
to coordinate household chores and work, but also an inability to find a
regular job. Such an age effect is not evident for males, except for
those over age 60. Nagase (1995) showed that the unwilling choice of
nonstandard work increases when women are over age 35 and when
men are over age 45 when controlling for education, area, and other
factors. 
In the 1990s, with the economy in a deep recession, the labor mar-
ket scene changed, with demands for a flexible and less costly work-
force becoming stronger.  Nonstandard work expanded not only among
housewives, but also among young males, and females and older
males. The share of nonstandard employees in nonagricultural employ-
ment (excluding the informal sector) rose by 6 percent from 1990 to
2000, to 18 percent for males younger than 25 and not attending
school, and to 28 percent for males over age 65, according to the Labor
Force Special Survey.  For females, the share increased by 7 percent-
age points from 1990 to 2000, to 49 percent for the age group 35–64,
and by 12 percent to 23 percent for females younger than age 24 and
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not attending school.  Part-time work still composes the largest share of
nonstandard employment, as shown in Table 8.1, but a new form of
nonstandard employment is increasing, and the definition of “part-
time” also includes full-time nonstandard workers, as will be discussed
below. 
SPECIFIC FEATURES OF JAPANESE “PART-TIME” 
WORKERS AND THEIR LOW WAGES 
A very interesting feature of part-time employment is that a large
body of workers is called “part-time” irrespective of work hours: their
jobs have been often low-paying and short-term, with flexibility in
working hours and fewer responsibilities.  Ichino (1989) concluded
that “part-time” workers are mostly married females and have longer
average work weeks, while “short work week” workers included com-
paratively more males.  Surprisingly, more than half of the workers
classified as part-time worked more than 35 hours in 1989, according
to the Labor Force Special Survey.  The percentage is lower (26 per-
cent) in 2000.1
This has much to do with Japanese employment practice that treats
the regular workers, or seishain, and nonstandard workers differently.
Court law has also supported such differential treatment.  The seishain
are hired as long-term contract workers, given greater job protection,
and often have wages linked to tenure.  Substantial biannual bonus
payments are customary as is a higher severance payment upon retire-
ment along with social security insurance coverage and other employee
benefits.  In return, the ready acceptance of overtime work and reloca-
tion was often required by employer and employee agreements.  Sug-
eno, from the viewpoint of labor law, comments that such agreement
can be rational under long-term labor contracts (Sugeno 1997, p. 101).
On the other hand, part-time employees and other nonstandard employ-
ees are provided less employment stability and lower wages.  There is
as yet only one court that has ruled that the wage difference between
workers of different work categories conducting the same work is
against public benefit.2  Kojima and Fujikawa (in this volume) explain
the different treatment and the law. 
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Nagase (1997a,b) found that hourly wages of female part-time
workers are as low as those of family workers and self-employed
workers when education, tenure, and other factors are controlled for
and when work selection correction was made.  The wage gap between
regular and part-time workers was found to be as large as 30 percent,
even when education, tenure, work selection correction, and other fac-
tors were controlled for. 
Despite the relatively higher demand for part-time than regular
full-time workers evident in more job openings and the job-seeker
ratio, the generally lower pecuniary compensation of part-time workers
compared with regular workers never narrowed.  Rather, the hourly
wage level compared with that of the average females in full-time reg-
ular workers deteriorated.  The average hourly wage gap between the
two was around 10 percent in the early 1970s, but declined throughout
the 1970s and leveled off in the 1980s.  It showed a small reversal dur-
ing the economic boom that began in 1986, but again started to decline
after 1990.  The Part-Time Labor Law was implemented in 1993 to
enhance the working conditions of part-time workers.  However, the
average hourly wage gap between part-time employees and regular
full-time employees is as large as 34 percent today.  Among female
part-time workers, only 35 percent were covered by Social Security
Insurance in 1995, and many fewer were covered by corporate bene-
fits. 
POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES CONCERNING 
WOMEN AND LABOR 
Policy changes that affected family and work were rather contra-
dictory, in that on one hand they encouraged female labor, and on the
other hand, increased protection to housewives.
The two main laws that encouraged female labor involvement were
the Equal Employment Opportunity Law and the Child Care Leave
Law.  The former was implemented in 1986 to prohibit discrimination
between sexes.  The law was outstanding but introductory, since many
clauses were written as “duty to make effort” for employers, and others
that were mandatory lacked any penalty.  Some clauses were strength-
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ened in 1999.  For example, the prohibition of discrimination between
men and women in hiring, location, and promotion became manda-
tory.3
The Child Care Leave Law was implemented in 1992 to facilitate
women’s work after childbirth.  It allowed leave from work until the
child reached the age of one.  Leave was originally nonpaid, but pecu-
niary compensation began with employment insurance in 1995, and the
level improved in 2001 to 40 percent of the previous salary.  The law
applied to all enterprises (including businesses with fewer than 30
employees) in 1995.  Leave, however, can exclude certain workers,4
and nonstandard workers are often excluded (Nihon Rodo Kenkyu
Kiko 2001).  Most nonstandard workers, therefore, lack child care
leave rights (Nagase 2000).  The leave law was strengthened in 2001.
On the other hand, changes made in the Tax and Social Insurance
Law increased benefits to low-earning or nonworking wives in the late
1980s and early 1990s.  It, in effect, promoted secondary employment
among women.
Securing women’s pension rights was on the agenda of the Pension
Reform Law of 1985.  Before the reform, housewives of waged and
salaried workers were not mandatory participants, but were supposed
to be supported by their husband’s public pension.  The new law made
social insurance mandatory for dependent spouses without any new
premium payment.5  The Ministry of Health and Welfare described the
reform as that of transferring part of the breadwinner’s income-related
national occupational pension to his dependent spouse while maintain-
ing the household total pension level.  However, although the reform
gave pension rights to nonearning and low-earning spouses, it did so by
gradually thinning the pension benefit of the full-time working popula-
tion without dependents.  After the reform, the only addition that a wife
could add to her pension by her own premium payment was the earn-
ings-related second tier, since she was already given the first tier.  On
the other hand, the dependent spouse gained the full basic pension with
no personal premium payment.
The definition of dependent spouse was quite generous: up to 1.3
million yen annually since the early 1990s.6  Moreover, all other social
security premium exemption rules for dependent spouses of waged and
salaried workers were tied to the same limit, namely the health insur-
ance premium and the long-term care insurance that was newly intro-
276 Nagase
duced in 1999.  Because the level of premium payment rose rapidly in
the 1990s, the benefit obtained by remaining as a dependent spouse in
effect enlarged.  In fact, according to the Statistics Bureau’s Basic
Employment Survey of 1997, among married females, more than 70
percent of nonstandard employees with children were earning less than
1 million yen, below the minimum level for tax and social security pay-
ments. 
In terms of tax, the Income Tax Special Deduction of Spouse was
introduced in 1987.  Before its introduction, the household tax
increased once a wife’s income exceeded a certain limit (then 0.9 mil-
lion yen) because the main income earner lost the full value of the
spouse’s deduction on his income tax.  The addition of the Special Tax
Deduction of Spouse was to lessen this large increase, not by reducing
the low-earning wives’ tax benefits, but by adding income steps on it.
Some observers noted that this change was implemented to ease the
heated objection of housewives to the introduction of the Consumption
Tax. 
Labor practices also encourage married women to stay home, or at
least remain low-income earners.  Many firms pay “spouse’s addition”
to the regular salary.  According to the General Survey on Wage and
Working Hours System of 1997, by the Ministry of Labor, and con-
ducted among enterprises with 30 and more full-time regular employ-
ees, 77 percent of the firms provided spouse allowances that averaged
10,500 yen a month.  However, the payment is often linked to whether
the wife is dependent.7
MARRIAGE, CHILDBIRTH, AND LABOR SUPPLY
Cohort Difference
Using the microdata from the Eleventh Japanese National Fertility
Survey—Married Women (hereafter referred to as Married Women), I
examine how having children affects the work choices of females.  The
data were collected by the National Institute of Population and Social
Security Research (NIPSSR) in 1997 for married women under age 50,
or born after 1948, and comprise a national sample of 7,370, when
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missing samples are excluded.  The data include retrospective ques-
tions on work status before and after marriage, date of first child’s
birth, and mother’s present work status.8
The upper half of Table 8.4 shows the older cohort (age 35 to 49
when surveyed), and the lower half shows the younger cohort, who
were under age 35.  A majority of married women in both cohorts (84
percent) had regular full-time employment before marriage.  The older
cohort had a slightly higher percentage of self-employment and no
work, while the younger cohort had a slightly higher percentage of
nonstandard work before marriage, but the difference is small. 
The transition at marriage in two age groups is shown in the second
column.  A higher proportion of the younger generation continues full-
time regular work after marriage; 46 percent versus 41 percent of the
older cohort.  Being a housewife, however, was still a popular choice:
as many as 40 percent of those under age 35 left the labor force to
Table 8.4 Change in Labor Force Participation and Type of Work with 
Marriage and Childbirth (%)






Total 9 12 14 16
Born 1948–1962
Regular employment 84 41 17 15 14 22 30
Nonstandard 
employment 11 10 3 4 3 2 4
Self-employed 2 5 5 7 6 6 2
Home piece rate work – 1 2 5 2 1 –
Out of labor force 3 42 67 61 71 66 62
Born 1963–
Regular employment 84 46 13 3 11 15 25
Nonstandard 
employment
7 12 4 3 5 3 2
Self-employed 4 2 3 9 3 3 3
Home piece rate work – 0 1 3 1 1 1
Out of labor force 5 39 70 77 74 73 65
a For those who are regular employees before marriage.  Nonstandard employment
includes part-time and arubaito.
SOURCE: Nagase (1999).
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become housewives, which is much higher relative to U.S. women, at
1.4 percent (Cassirer, Table 9.11, in this volume).9
Despite the Child Care Leave Law, work continuation dropped
slightly for the younger generation after the birth of their first child
(third column, Table 8.4).  About 70 percent of women were found to
be out of the labor force when their first child was one.10  More than
half of those who remained in regular work at marriage quit work at
childbirth, which again is exceptionally high compared with 6 percent
in the United States (Cassirer, in this volume).
The next four columns show the difference in work status by edu-
cational attainment when the first child is age one.  High school gradu-
ates compose the largest share of females, 49 percent for the younger
and 53 percent for the older age group.  Only 14 percent of high school
graduates in the older cohort held a full-time regular job after their first
child was born, and the percentage was 11 for the younger age group.
Although more university and college graduates continued work, the
percentage who held regular jobs declined in the younger age group.
Overall, 62 percent of university graduates were out of the labor force
in the older age group, and 65 percent in the younger age group.11
Because the Married Women does not include those who would
marry in the future, young women who would marry and would have
births in their 30s are excluded from the data.  Osawa and Suzuki
(2000) pointed out that there is an emergence of educated women who
postpone childbirth until the 30s and continue work after childbirth.  In
these data, too, if the sample is restricted to more educated and those
who had their first child in later years,12 a small sign of increased par-
ticipation after childbirth was seen for the younger generation.  It
should also be noted that, although increasing, women who have their
first child in their 30s are a minority.13  Therefore, it is still uncertain
whether postponed marriage will result in continued labor participation
after childbirth in the future or whether more women in the younger
cohort will remain childless.  The likelihood of the latter so far seems
to be higher.  The birth projection of NIPSSR in 2002 predicted that 31
percent of women born in the 1985 cohort would remain childless and
17 percent would not marry. 
Since a small decline in labor force participation for the younger
cohort is rather surprising, I checked two sets of larger cross-sectional
data, the Basic Employment Survey of 1987 and 1997, to confirm the
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findings on the women’s work pattern.  By the cross-sectional compar-
ison, the labor participation rates of mothers of young children are low
and show almost no change.14
A much larger and significant change in behavior is the delay in
marriage among both sexes in Japan.  According to the census, among
women in their late 20s, only one in four were not married in 1980.  In
2000, the ratio was over one in two.  The number of women who are
not married in their early 30s is also on the rise.  The percentage was 10
percent for those born between 1951 and 1955, 14 percent for those
born between 1956 and 1960, 20 percent for those born between 1961
and 1965, and 27 percent for those born between 1966 and 1970.  This
means that a higher percentage of younger women continue to work
while postponing marriage.  However, when they do get married, about
40 percent still become full-time housewives.
Child Care
The Married Women survey also included a question on the main
caregivers of the first child in his or her first year.15  The data show that
before the Child Care Leave Law was enacted, only 1.9 percent of
mothers used child care leave.  The use of such leave increased after
the implementation of the law, yet fewer than 10 percent of the total
births used this leave even after 1996.  The use of child care leave is
low because a substantial number of women were already out of the
labor force before pregnancy, and even for those who worked during
pregnancy, about 60 percent chose to quit work right before childbirth.
It is, however, also true that child care for regularly employed
workers changed substantially in recent years.  The use of child care
leave increased from 5 percent to 39 percent when comparing children
born between 1966 and 1986 and those born between 1992 and 1997.
The use of government-sponsored day care also increased from 7 to 18
percent, while the role of cohabiting grandparents declined from 36 to
22 percent and the role of noncohabiting grandparents increased.
Grandmothers who were the main child support during work before are
now increasingly replaced by more formal care and formal leave.
However, one should again recall that only 20 to 30 percent of women,
a minority, continue work when the child reaches age one. 
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Choice of Retirement, Full-Time Work, and Part-Time Work
 at Childbirth 
In this section, work choice after first childbirth will be analyzed by
multinomial logit analysis for those women who had full-time, regular
employment prior to giving birth. Three different statuses are compared
when the mother’s child is age one: 1) continuation of full-time work
with a regular contract, 2) change to part-time or other nonstandard
form of employment, including informal employment, and 3) retire-
ment from full-time regular work.
For explanatory variables, education, occupation, and a firm-size
dummy before childbirth were used to account for the wage level of the
women.  In Japan, in general, larger firms on average pay higher
wages.16  Family characteristics, such as the husband’s income and hav-
ing a grandmother in the family, were included in the regression as
variables for the reservation wage.  Higher wages are expected to
increase participation, while a higher reservation wage is expected to
increase the probability of leaving the labor force.  One’s attitudes
toward family and marriage, which were derived by factor analyses,
were added, as well as one’s mother’s work history to determine the
effect of attitude and values (see Appendix A, Table 8.A1).  The choice
to work in regular employment is expected to be a longer-term choice,
while participation in a nonstandard job is a short-term choice owing to
the current need for income.
Table 8.5 shows that highly educated mothers are more likely to
continue full-time regular work instead of leaving the labor force (the
base category in the multinomial logit models).  Having a full-time
position at large firms before childbirth did not increase the probability
of mothers continuing to work.  However, when mothers do continue to
work, they are less likely to change their jobs to nonstandard work if
they had a regular position at larger firms.  In terms of occupation,
women in professional, technical, and managerial occupations, as well
as blue-collar workers, are more likely to continue work, while clerical
workers are most likely to leave the labor force at childbirth.  Workers
in sales and service are likely to work as nonstandard workers.  Public
servants are most likely to continue a regular full-time job, possibly
because the child care leave can more easily be taken and also because
the male-female wage gap is often small in this sector.
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Table 8.5 Multinomial Logit Analysis of Employment Status of Women 
(to age 49) When First Child is Age 1
Full-time Nonstandard
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Educational attainment (base = junior 
high school)
High school 0.371 1.35 –0.151 0.46
College 0.677** 2.27 –0.402 1.06
University 1.104*** 3.25 –0.575 1.12
Workplace characteristics (base = 
firm size below 30)
Firm size 30–99 –0.002 0.01 0.097 0.39
Firm size 100–299 –0.027 0.15 –0.641** 2.26
Firm size 300–999 0.367* 1.92 –0.194 0.66
Firm size 1000+ 0.099 0.57 –0.470* 1.79
Work in public sector 1.792*** 8.41 –0.069 0.15
Occupation (base = clerical and 
others)
Professional and technical 0.536*** 3.82 0.761*** 3.28
Administrative 1.564** 2.31 –30.125 0.00
Sales and service –0.152 0.86 0.460* 1.90
Blue-collar work 0.823*** 4.06 1.102*** 3.84
Family characteristics
Husband self-employed –0.064 0.38 0.678*** 3.12
Extended family 0.996*** 8.56 0.413** 2.27
Income of husband –0.002*** 3.10 –0.001 1.21
Years after marriage –0.003 0.16 –0.010 0.36
Child born after the enactment of  
Child Care Leave Law –0.185 1.28 0.035 0.16
One’s mother’s work history (base = 
worked when children were small)
At home when children were small –0.542*** 4.02 –0.317 1.53
Never worked –0.285** 2.08 –0.443* 1.93
Attitude toward family and marriage
Traditional 0.016*** 2.47 0.001 0.05
Individualistic 0.031*** 4.74 –0.001 0.13





Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Constant –4.791*** 3.63 –1.286 0.64
Sample size 1959
Psuedo adjusted R2 0.123
Log likelihood –1564.52
NOTE: The base category is “out of labor force.”  Nonstandard work includes part-
time, arubaito, and family- and self-employment. The analysis was conducted only
with those who had full-time regular work prior to childbirth.
*p = 0.1; **p = 0.05; ***p = 0.01.
SOURCE: Nagase (1999).
The general family environment and taste also have a large explan-
atory power. Mothers with kin help from the extended family are more
likely to continue full-time regular employment.  On the other hand,
higher husband income decreases the probability of continuing full-
time regular work.17  Mothers are more likely to follow the way they
themselves were raised.  They are more likely to leave the labor force
when their own mother stayed at home during their childhood.  Tradi-
tional as well as individualistic attitudes toward marriage encourage
continuation of full-time regular work.18
Interestingly, the enactment of the Child Care Leave Law did not
have a significant effect on the work continuation choice.  The sign
was even negative.  This could be owing to the prolonged recession
after the enactment of the law.  It could also be that the commitment
requirement of full-time regular work strengthened further during the
recession.  The shortage of government-sponsored child care facilities
also remained high, especially in the cities.  Because I included family
workers in the category of nonstandard work, the choice of nonstand-
ard work increases when the husband is self-employed.
The multinomial logit analysis shows (in contrast to the United
States; Cassirer, in this volume) that nonstandard work in Japan
increases only slightly after childbirth, except for self-employed house-
holds, some manual workers, and professionals.  This may be due to a
large drop in wages for part-time employment, which will be discussed
later.
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Reentry to the Labor Market
When and how do the 70 percent of women who were out of the
labor force return to the labor market?  Because the data lack the direct
timing of the return to labor market, I will show the cross-sectional
relationship of the youngest child’s age and present work status.
Table 8.6 shows the labor participation and work category of moth-
ers by the age of their youngest child.  It only includes those mothers
who were out of the labor force when their first child was age one.  The
reentry to work differs by educational attainment.  Returning to work
is, in contrast to other countries, less common when mothers have
higher education.  The percentage of women out of the labor force
declines as children age, but it is 44 percent for university graduates
and 29 percent for high school graduates when the youngest child is
older than age 12.  The “over 12” category includes mostly women in
their 40s.  The most popular way to reenter the labor market was
through work in nonstandard employment, that is, part-time and
arubaito.  Self-employment was also comparatively higher among the
lower-educated group and also the university graduates.19
On the other hand, Table 8.7 shows the more educated had the
higher and stronger attachment to regular full-time work when the first
child was at age one.  Approximately 60 percent remain in regular
work, while the percentage is less than 40 percent for high school grad-
uates.  The less-educated are more likely to quit or change work, per-
haps when they have a second child or when the first child grows up. 
The continuation of work at marriage has advanced for the younger
generation, but the trend has not extended to continuing work upon
childbirth.  Delaying marriage became popular, rather than a new work
style that balances family and work.  Unlike in many other countries,
fewer women in Japan use part-time work as a bridge to continue work
when they have small children.  Part-time work is often selected by
those who reenter employment, especially among the lower-educated,
and the ratio of regular full-time employment does not increase much
even when one’s smallest child grows older.  Although only a minority
of mothers continue to work right after the birth of the first child, when
they do, it is the more educated who are likely to be attached to this
regular employment opportunity.  Another feature is that the highly
284Table 8.6 Work Pattern by the Age of Youngest Child and by Mother’s Educational Attainment (for those who were 
out of labor force when the first child was age one)
Age of 
youngest child
Out of labor force (%)
Nonstandard 
employment (%) Standard employment (%)
Family work, self-
employment (%)
9 yrs 12 yrs 14 yrs 16 yrs 9 yrs 12 yrs 14 yrs 16 yrs 9 yrs 12 yrs 14 yrs 16 yrs 9 yrs 12 yrs 14 yrs 16 yrs
< 3 years of age 80 88 89 88 7 6 4 6 2 1 1 3 10 4 5 4
3–6 years of age 77 61 69 68 15 24 19 16 0 5 3 9 8 10 9 7
6– 9 years
of age 
28 43 51 63 50 40 30 15 6 4 5 4 17 12 14 17
9–12 years 
of age 
38 40 39 47 43 42 39 28 0 8 13 19 19 10 10 7
12+ 27 29 35 44 37 45 41 33 19 15 14 7 18 11 11 16
Total 40 50 60 65 32 32 24 18 12 8 7 7 16 10 9 10
SOURCE: Nagase (2000).
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educated are likely not to return to work once they leave the labor
force.  I now turn to why this is the case.  
WAGE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WORK CATEGORIES AND 
INCOME ADJUSTMENT FOR TAX PURPOSES
One answer to this question is the large wage gap and the less
favorable working conditions of nonstandard workers, and the diffi-
culty of returning to regular, full-time, white-collar jobs with seniority
payment. 
In this section, using the Married Women, I will first show that the
continuation of work in part-time status does not increase future wages.
The Survey on Diversified Workers at the Workplace will be used to
show that the income adjustments of housewives have a very large
impact on the low wages of part-time workers, and that the acceptance
of low wages and satisfaction toward work in nonstandard employment
is rather high for married females and low for nonmarried females.
The Married Women is not the best data set for studying income, as
it only has six annual income categories of present income and no data
on work hours.20  However, on examining the income pattern, it does
exhibit the characteristics of different work categories.  For women
with children working as part-time or arubaito, as many as 79 percent
Table 8.7 Work Pattern by the Age of Youngest Child and by Educational 
Attainment (for those who were in full-time regular work when 
the first child was age one)
Standard employment (%)
Age of youngest child 9 yrs 12 yrs 14 yrs 16 yrs
< 3 years of age 8 37 43 63
3–6 years of age 14 36 46 67
6–9 years of age 9 31 37 43
9–12 years of age 36 35 52 56
12+ 26 34 45 62
Total 23 35 44 59
SOURCE: Nagase (2000).
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earn below the level for income tax levies.  The comparable figure was
6 percent for regular work and 49 percent for family workers and the
self-employed.  The lowest two income categories covered 97 percent
of nonstandard workers, while the comparable figure was 21 percent
for regular workers and 67 percent for informal work participants. 
Table 8.8 shows the regression with the logarithm of present
annual income as the dependent variable for the sample of women with
children who had regular work positions before marriage.21  The work
category was the most significant explanatory variable for the differ-
ence in annual income.  The annual income of wives with children was
reduced by 55 percent if they were in nonstandard work and was
increased by 74 percent if they were in regular work, compared with
the informal sector work and while not counting for the work hour dif-
ferences.  Continuation of regular work after marriage significantly
increased present income by 8 percent, while a change to nonstandard
work did not.  Continuation of regular work at the birth of the first
child significantly increased present income by 27 percent, while the
continuation as a nonstandard worker did not.  Interestingly, the effect
of childbirth after 1996 or having children under age 2, as well as the
effect of childbirth after 1991 or children under age 6, are positive and
significant on the annual income.  Because these are samples of women
who have children, this may be interpreted as “recent births.”  The
Equal Employment Opportunity Law and the Child Care Leave Law
may have helped to increase the continued participation of potentially
higher-income mothers, though the percentage to total of such females
is still very small.  The selection equation shows that labor force partic-
ipation declined when children under 6 are at home and when the hus-
band’s income was high, and increased when kin help was available
and when the wives had family work opportunities, all of which sug-
gests the effect through the reservation wage.  Labor participation
increased with educational attainment when other factors are con-
trolled for.  When the women’s mother had been a full-time housewife,
their labor participation significantly declined, showing the effect of
inheritance of “family values.”  Overall, the regression showed that the
continuation of “regular employment” increased future income while
nonstandard work employment never did.
How much can the difference in annual income be attributed to
work hour differences?  The annual income difference attributable to
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Table 8.8 Income Regression for Mothers with Children: The Effect of 
Work Continuation on Present Income
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-value
Wage regression
Age 0.021*** 8.25
Education (junior high school = base)
High school graduate 0.021 0.48
College graduate 0.066 1.37
University graduate 0.162*** 2.71
Occupation (blue-collar workers = base)
Professional and technical workers 0.231*** 6.25
Managers and officials 0.416*** 4.08
Clerical and related workers 0.203*** 6.19
Sales and service workers 0.057* 1.86
Work status (informal and other nonstandard 
work = base)
Full-time and regularly employed 0.739*** 19.92
Part-time or arubaito work –0.548*** 17.42
Work choice right after marriage (full-time 
housewife = base)
Full-time and regularly employed 0.082*** 2.97
Part-time or arubaito work 0.013 0.34
Work choice right after childbirth (full-time 
housewife = base)
Full-time and regularly employed 0.276*** 8.10
Part-time or arubaito work 0.027 0.49
Number of children –0.020 1.30
First child birth year (birth before 1991 = base)
Births after 1996 0.138*** 2.33
Births after 1991 0.132*** 3.04
λ –0.299 0.40
Constants 3.872*** 31.23
Probability of labor participation equation
Education (junior high school = base)
High school graduate 0.070*** 0.89
College graduate 0.177*** 2.10




Explanatory variables Coefficient t-value
Husband self-employed 0.403*** 7.18
Live within extended family at marriage 0.370*** 8.72
Husband’s income (predicted) –0.002*** 6.97
First child birth year (birth before 1991 = base)
Births after 1996 –0.438*** 6.39
Births after 1991 –0.750*** 17.05
One’s mother’s career (worked throughout her 
life = base)
Interrupted work when children are small –0.065 1.41
Full-time housewife throughout her life –0.210*** 4.77
Constant 1.112*** 8.31
Log likelihood –5469.779
Sample size noncensored 2798
Total for those who had regular work before 
marriage 5043
*p = 0.1; **p = 0.05; ***p = 0.01.
SOURCE: Nagase (2000); Nagase (2001).
work hours can be estimated at around 30 to 40 percent,22 which
explains only a part of the income difference shown in Table 8.8 by
work category.  Wage regressions using different data sets consistently
showed that the part-time wage is very low, distinctly lower than that
of regular employment even when hours, education, tenure, and other
factors are controlled for, and that the return to education and experi-
ence is low (see, for example, Houseman and Osawa, in this volume). 
The low wage rate of part-time workers was often attributed to the
intermittent work experience, the low skill level, the lower educational
level, or the lack of commitment to work.  Nitta (1993a,b), for exam-
ple, argued that for many part-time workers, their wage was only addi-
tional income to their household and they had little ambition to
increase the wage.  Sato (1998), moreover, pointed out that more part-
time workers replied that they are contented with their work compared
with full-time regular workers, even though their wage level is low; he
also pointed out that their preferences are distinctly different from
those of full-time regular workers.  Higuchi (1981) treated work choice
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as a high-wage, long-work-hour set and a low-wage, short-work-hour
set, implicitly treating the low wage of part-time workers as a compen-
sating wage differential for work hours.  Osawa (1993, 1994) and
Asakura (2001), on the other hand, argued that the wage gap is the
direct result of the Japanese employment system, which discriminates
among workers by working status and not by hours.  Nagase (1994),
using microdata, estimated the effect of “short-hours” and “part-time
hiring status” in the wage regression of married females.  The result
showed a strong negative effect of the latter, but the effect of the
former was small.  She concluded that the wage gap cannot be fully
attributed to a compensating differential to short hours worked but to
an entry barrier to regular status work, especially for the long-work-
week “part-time hiring status” workers.  Nagase (1997b) further found
the widening and the large wage gap to be self-enforcing because of the
social security and tax system.  Takeishi (2001), on the other hand,
based on interviews with 50 companies that had high nonstandard
worker:employee ratios, showed that in many firms, part-time employ-
ees are increasingly substituted for work that was formerly done by
full-time regular employees.  She concluded that more part-time work-
ers are taking on greater responsibilities.  Her interviews, however, also
showed that often pecuniary compensation does not parallel the
increase in responsibilities. 
For the remainder of the discussion, I use the Survey on Diversi-
fied Workers at the Workplace, conducted by the Japan Institute of
Labor in 1999.23  This survey was conducted with nonstandard workers
to determine how the nonstandard workers viewed their wages in rela-
tion to full-time regular workers at the same workplace in relation to
their work-hour flexibility, their responsibility and level of work, and
so forth.  The survey also asked whether the nonstandard workers
believe the wage difference between full-time regular workers at the
same workplace is reasonable.
As to the wage rate difference, 72 percent of nonstandard workers
replied that their hourly wage rate was lower than those of full-time
regular employees.  Among them, 43 percent accepted the difference as
understandable and 39 percent replied it was unreasonable.  Responsi-
bility and work content were important elements for acceptability.
Thirty-three percent of those who replied “understandable” said that
the difference was reasonable because of differences in responsibility,
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and 24 percent because of the differences in work content.  On the
other hand, 53 percent of those who replied “unreasonable” thought
that the content and responsibility of the work were the same.  The dis-
sent rose with nonstandard employee experience.  Among nonstandard
workers who viewed their work level as equal to that of the entry level
of seishain, the percentage of dissent was only 17 percent.  Among
those who viewed their work as equal to seishain with five or more
years of tenure, 46 percent thought the wage difference was unreason-
able.  The percentage of dissent was near 50 percent among females
who were in a nonstandard job because they could not find regular full-
time work, but the percentage was lower, 27 percent, for males with
similar reason.  On the other hand, the percentage of those who replied
“understandable” was the highest, at 40 percent, among those who tar-
geted their income below a certain level.  Among married females, 51
percent voluntarily chose nonstandard employment and 30 percent
involuntarily ended up as such due to a lack of full-time work.  The
percentage was just the opposite for unmarried females: 25 percent
voluntary and 51 percent involuntary.  The involuntary percentage for
males was about the same as that for married females, 30 percent,
which highlights a significant difference in dissent by sex and marital
status.
On the whole, dissent about wages was highest for unmarried and
divorced females, followed by married females who were unable to
find a regular job.  In contrast, dissent was, on average, low for males
and the lowest for the married females who were controlling their earn-
ings below the tax levy limit.
Today, part-time work is very much linked to non–tax-levied
income levels, especially among married females.  Because many
wives adjust their work hours to fall below the income threshold, the
annual income distribution is extraordinarily skewed for part-time
workers.  These data show that as many as 39 percent of all nonstand-
ard working married females were found to be on the critical target,
ready to decrease their work hours once they met the increase in wage
level. Twenty-nine percent of all married females are exactly in the
critical income bracket for tax purposes (the bracket from 0.9 to 1.03
million yen).  Those who paid the tax but avoided the social security
payment (who were in the income bracket of 1.03 million to 1.3 mil-
lion) composed another 10 percent.  This ratio corresponded well with
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their reply on the questionnaire, “Are you adjusting your work hours or
work days for the consideration of tax and other income limits, so that
annual income does not exceed a certain limit?”  When the sample is
confined to married women working shorter hours compared with reg-
ular workers at the workplace, 52 percent replied that they were
“income targeting.”24  A study group at the Cabinet Office estimated
that if a wife increased her income from 1.03 to 1.40 million yen, total
household income would increase by a mere 0.02 million yen due to
the rise in tax by 0.04, social security by 0.14, and a spouse allowance
reduction of 0.18 million yen (Study Group at Cabinet Office 2001).
The estimated 0.38 million yen fixed cost equals 428 labor hours when
measured by the average hourly wage of female part-time workers of
877 yen.  This institutional hedge is strongly affecting the part-time
wage and the labor supply of part-time workers.
Married females are still a large source of supply to the nonstand-
ard labor market.25  The effect of wage increases on labor supply in
general is not determined in economic theory, for it is the combined
effect of the negative income effect and the positive substitution effect.
However, if the “income-targeting” behavior is very strong, the wage
increase is only met by work hour decreases in the same ratio for those
who are at the threshold.  When such behavior is predicted, firms
would be unwilling to increase wages unless the employees agree
beforehand to work over the 1.03 million yen ceiling.  On the other
hand, married females would not gain by working more hours unless
the firm promises to raise the hourly wage so as to cover the fixed
expenses in tax and social security to overcome the target.
Because the data set has only data for nonstandard workers, I con-
ducted a wage regression of nonstandard workers while dividing the
sample by those who target their income below a certain ceiling and
those who do not (see Table 8.9).26  The intention to adjust one’s work-
ing hours for the purpose of income targeting was used to make a self-
selection correction in the wage regression.  The wage regression
shows that the return on education is much lower for those who are
ready to income target.  Higher responsibility in the work ladder is also
reflected more fully for those who do not adjust their work hours.
Interestingly, lambda is positive, showing that the errors in wage and
errors in those who target income below the ceiling are positively
related.  This can be interpreted as meaning that those women who tar-
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Table 8.9 Wage Regression of Nonstandard Workers: Those 
Adjusting Work Hours below Tax or Social Insurance 
Fee Exemption Ceiling and Those Who Do Not Intend to
Target Specific Income
Target income ceiling No work hour adjustment
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Wage regression
Educational attainment (base = 9 
years)
12 years 0.059*** 2.50 0.043** 1.93
14 years 0.102*** 4.05 0.135*** 4.62
16 years 0.120*** 3.60 0.257*** 5.94
Tenure 0.008*** 3.00 –0.001 0.22
Tenure2 0.000*** 2.58 0.000* 1.86
All work experience years 0.000 0.27 0.001 0.81
Level of job as compared to full-
time regular workers (base = 1–2 
years tenure equivalent)
Equivalent to 3–4 year tenure
full-timers –0.010 0.94 0.063*** 3.76
Equivalent to more than 5-year 
tenure full-timers 0.001 0.04 0.082*** 3.93
Group leaders 0.013 0.46 0.084*** 2.98
More than group leaders –0.091*** 4.42 0.147*** 3.09
No answer (cannot be 
compared) –0.013 0.93 0.047*** 2.15
Job similarity with full-time 
regular workers (base = nothing 
in common)
Do much same work as full-
timers 0.010 0.43 –0.063*** 2.45
Have some work similar as full-
timers –0.003 0.12 –0.101*** 3.93
Not much similarity 0.004 0.17 –0.082*** 2.87
Occupation
Clerical 0.032*** 2.79 0.035* 1.89
Professional 0.106*** 2.72 0.151*** 4.22
Sales 0.015 0.89 0.008 0.29
Service 0.019 1.03 0.029 1.17
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Target income ceiling No work hour adjustment
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Blue-collar work –0.016 1.16 –0.052*** 2.98
Think the low wage unreasonable –0.019* 1.78 –0.050*** 3.47
Constant 6.409*** 103.12 6.752*** 208.82
Selection equation
Single, not married –0.522*** 5.79 0.625*** 10.15
Could not find regular full-time 
job –0.580*** 6.24 0.821*** 15.91
Educational attainment (base = 9 
years)
12 years 0.400*** 4.96 –0.293*** 3.76
14 years 0.360*** 3.79 –0.230*** 2.50
16 years 0.400*** 3.14 –0.256** 2.03
No children in household –0.159*** 2.57 0.177*** 2.87
Child < 6 –0.063 0.66 0.108 0.98
Child < 10 –0.020 0.28 0.018 0.19
Child < 15 0.210*** 3.43 –0.256*** 3.61
Constant –0.553*** 6.10 0.228*** 3.03
1/2 ln(1+ρi)/(1–ρi) 1.240*** 4.84 –0.281*** 6.74




Noncensored sample 1075 2214
Censored sample 2464 1179
All samples 3539 3393
Log likelihood –1355.454 –2274.272
*p = 0.10; **p = 0.05; ***p  = 0.01.
SOURCE: Nagase (2002).
get their work hours to make the most of the present tax and social
security exemption system are those who may potentially have higher
quality, controlling for education and for the type of work that they do.
This is probably because nonstandard workers who work over the ceil-
ing consist of those who were unable to find a full-time regular job.  If
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they did find a better job in regular employment, they would not be
included in the data.
The self-selection regression shows that the probability that mar-
ried females adjust work hours is high compared with singles, espe-
cially when they have children older than age 10 but younger than 15
compared with those who have children over age 15.  Women without
children, including those whose children have left home, are more
likely to exceed the non-tax-levied bracket.  The lowest-educated
group is more likely not to income target their work hours, possibly
because their spouse is in a lower income bracket, or because they can-
not make the transition from nonstandard work to regular full-time
work, even though they want to work longer hours. 
CONCLUSION
Half of women workers in Japan currently work in nonstandard
work arrangements, and the ratio has risen rapidly in the past decade.
According to the Married Women, more than 80 percent of women had
regular full-time positions before marriage, but among them, 40 per-
cent left the labor force at marriage and more left at first childbirth,
leaving only 20 to 30 percent in the labor force one year after first
childbirth.  Among those who are out of the labor force, the less-edu-
cated are likely to return as nonstandard employees.  The labor force
participation rate of mothers, therefore, drops at first childbirth, but
eventually rises to more than 70 percent when their children are over
age 13, with 60 percent of them working as nonstandard employees.
The higher-educated are more likely to continue to work in regular full-
time employment.  Yet, the majority of university graduates also leave
the labor force at childbirth and are less likely to return relative to the
lower-educated category.  Perhaps the largest difference between the
countries compared in this volume is that few women in Japan use
part-time employment as a bridge to continue employment through
child-rearing.  The majority interrupt work for some years, but if they
do work, those with higher education and those employed in larger
firms prefer to continue to work in regular full-time positions rather
than in part-time work.  This is possibly because the wage level is very
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low in part-time work, while the wage return on work continuation is
much higher for full-time regular employment, especially for those
with higher education and those who work at larger firms.  The deci-
sion has much to do with Japanese long-term employment practices
with seniority payment, which excludes nonstandard employees from
the same wage table.  The percentage of those who continue work has
not changed much even for younger females, though younger genera-
tions increasingly postpone marriage and childbirth.
The wage rate of part-time workers is low, and the gap has not nar-
rowed in recent years despite the relatively higher demand for non-
standard workers and despite findings that part-time workers are
increasingly taking on greater responsibilities.  Why is this, and is the
work choice as a nonstandard employee voluntary?  Many surveys
have shown a higher percentage of part-time workers are content with
work compared with regular full-time workers.  This is rather surpris-
ing, though the level of expectation toward work may be lower for
part-time workers.  In terms of wages, however, the Survey on the
Diversified Workers at Workplace showed that about 40 percent of
nonstandard workers who replied that they are being paid less than
full-time regular workers thought the gap was unreasonable.  Interest-
ingly, more married women, many of whom adjusted their work hours
below the tax-free level, replied that they thought the gap was reason-
able.  On the other hand, more unmarried women (either never married
or divorced) thought the gap was unreasonable.  The actual wage level
of the latter was not lower, but more thought the wage level was unrea-
sonable.  The percentage of workers who thought the gap was unrea-
sonable rose with work level and was higher for women than for men.
Analysis showed that the tax and social security fee exemption criteria
caps the preferred annual income for housewives, and this discouraged
work hours of potentially more able workers.  The income-targeting
behavior creates a negative relationship between wages and work
hours, and this must have had a negative impact on the average wages
of part-time workers.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Law implemented in 1986
and amended in 1999, as well as the Child Care Leave Law of 1992,
aimed to better the working conditions of women in standard work.
The change in society, however, has not increased the continuation of
work among mothers.  Benefits to nonearning wives, on the other hand,
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have strengthened the effect on work hours among part-time workers in
the past decade.  The benefit has caused many married females to self-
restrain their income below the ceiling, which in turn restricted their
wage level.  Although surveys show that many part-time workers are
content with their low-wage job, an important change of the labor mar-
ket in the 1990s was that more unmarried and divorced females
increased their presence in this nonstandard labor market.  Before the
1990s, the nonstandard work market was primarily for middle-aged
housewives, but it is now being transformed rapidly by newcomers.
More women may be included as involuntary nonstandard workers in
this new group. 
Notes
1. Three factors may have contributed to the decrease in average work hours.  Previ-
ously, long work week workers hired as “part-time” were most popular in manu-
facturing, but such work opportunities decreased due to the decline in the
manufacturing sector and the increase in sales and clerical work.  The second fac-
tor was avoidance of tax and social security payments.  As the general wage level
increased while the tax-free limit remained stable, more part-time workers and
businesses shortened the hours of work to avoid tax and insurance premiums (see
next section).  The third factor was the general decline in work hours of regular
workers and the subsequent decline in average work hours of part-time workers
beginning in 1987 following the Labor Standard Law that reduced the work week
to 40 hours (from 48); the phase-in period ended in 1999.  More firms today, how-
ever, are starting to hire nonstandard employees again for long hours to substitute
for regular workers.  
2. Maruko Keihoki Sosho at District Court in 1996 was the first court that ruled that,
even though an employer has degrees of freedom in wage setting among different
work contract categories, wage differences of more than 80 percent cannot be
accepted.  At this firm, only males and nonmarried females were hired as seishain
and all the married women were hired as part-time, though their designated work
hours were only 15 minutes shorter than seishain and their work days were the
same as seishain.  The work contract was only two months, but because of recon-
tracting, part-time workers had tenures from 4 to 25 years.  They were doing the
same work as female seishain in the factory line, though over time fewer female
seishain were doing the same work and were replaced by part-time workers.
Although seishain were given a senority factor in their wages, part-time workers
had only three steps in their wages.  The wage gap was calculated as 34 percent
for a woman working for 25 years.  One woman reported that her wages were
lower than newly hired female seishain in their first year.  The court ruled that the
seniority payment is basic practice in Japan, and so the same work/same payment
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principle cannot be said to exist as a general norm in Japan.  That said, however,
people in general should be paid equally for the same work in principle, and wage
differences of more than 80 percent cannot be accepted.  Sugeno and Suwa
(1998), skeptical of the court decision, commented that because of the different
labor practice, especially because seishain are paid by age, tenure, educational
level, work attitude, performance, number of dependents, and other factors, the
equal job/equal payment principle between seishain and part-time workers cannot
be supported.  
3. At the same time, the Labor Standard Law’s protection of female workers was
reconstructed as protection to mothers.  In 1997, general protections for female
workers that capped overtime work and banned work after midnight were
removed and protections became equal between the sexes.
4. Daily laborers and workers with definite duration of contract are excluded from
leave eligibility.  Also, the following workers can be excluded under employer-
employee contract: workers with less than one year of tenure, worker whose
spouse can take care of the child, workers whose contract ends within one year,
workers with less than two days work days.  Nonstandard workers, though in
actuality having more than one year tenure, often have a defined duration contract
that ends within a year.
5. The change was made such that if the working spouse paid his own portion of
income-related pension fee, the nonworking spouse was given the full record of
full premium payment for the first tier of the public pension.  Wives working as
“part-time” were included as “nonworking” if their income was below a defined
limit.  A couple with the same income were to be given the same premium pay-
ment and the same pension level regardless of whether the couple was a double
income or a single income couple in principle.
6. It was 0.9 million yen, the same as the tax-free bracket in 1985; it was  raised to 1
million yen in 1987, to 1.1 in 1989, to 1.2 in 1992, to 1.3 in 1993, and has
remained at 1.3 million yen since. 
7. According to this survey, 50 percent linked the eligibility of the spouse allowance
to the spouse’s income level, and 76 percent of those firms linked eligibility limits
to annual income of 1.03 million yen.  This is the amount where the tax levy to the
wage and salaried worker begins and where one’s spouse loses the spouse deduc-
tion if the worker is married.
8. Births out of wedlock are exceptionally low in Japan (fewer than 2 percent in
2000).  Although the divorce rate is rising, only 1.4 percent of all households were
headed by single mothers (0.61 million households) in 1999, according to the
Ministry of Health and Welfare (Kokumin Seikatu Kiso Chosa).  Therefore, the
Married Women is representative of the labor pattern of Japanese mothers.
Because panel data available in Japan concerning such issues are limited, these
data may be the best national sample covering different cohorts on such questions.
9. It should be stressed, however, that the U.S. sample that Cassirer used is not
directly comparable to the Married Women data. The U.S. data is panel data that
was gathered in 1994, 1996, and 1998, and the women who were surveyed were
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aged 29–39. Cassirer shows the labor supply behavior of women whose marriage
and childbirthing occurred primarily in their 30s. It is probable that those women
have higher attachment to work than women who married or bore children in their
20s. On the other hand, Married Women data is retrospective data, and it shows
the labor supply behavior of women who married mostly in their 20s.
10. Such a general tendency was found when extended families were treated sepa-
rately, and when cities and rural areas were treated differently.
11. To control for age of marriage and age of childbirth between cohorts, I restricted
the marriage age and the age of the first child to those between age 25 and 30 and
compared the age groups 30–34 and 35–49.  However, despite such control, the
overall trend was about the same, especially for the more educated group.  For
university and college graduates, more women continued work in the older gener-
ation; for the younger age group, 73 percent became housewives and 19 percent
stayed in regular work, while for the older group, 65 percent became housewives
and 24 percent continued regular work.
12. For example, 14 or more years of education and the birth of the first child at age
30 to 34.  Among women aged 35–40, 24 percent continued regular work as
opposed to 22 percent in the 40–49 age group.  The percentage of those out of the
labor force was also slightly less.
13. The peak age for having a first child was age 26–27 in 2000.
14. Traditionally, women continued work in extended families with the help of kin
care, but such extended families declined within a decade, from 22 percent in
1987 to 15 percent in 1997.  When only the nuclear families are compared, a small
rise (rather than a drop) is seen.  Because the Basic Employment Survey only
shows the work pattern of the last child, not the first, these results can be inter-
preted either as a small rise in continuation or as a slight speed-up in the return to
employment.
15. Respondents could choose up to three options among the twelve candidates, such
as one’s self, father, kin, or whether day care, child care leave, or other institu-
tional help was used.
16. See, for example, the wage regression for husbands and the effect of firm size in
Appendix A, Table 8.A2.
17. Because information on the husband’s income at childbirth is not available, I esti-
mate the husband’s permanent income from his educational attainment and from
the size of the firm for which he works and used the predicted income for Table
8.5 (in Appendix A, Table 8.A2).
18. By factor analysis and scoring, three attitudes concerning marriage and family
were taken out: the traditional attitude that places high values in marriage, in hav-
ing children, and in supporting division of work between the sexes.  The second
axis was the individualistic attitude that supports one to pursue one’s own objec-
tive in life and accepts divorce if a couple does not get along.  The last attitude is
one that supports sexual relationships before marriage, and the attitude that mar-
riage and a love affair are different.  The younger cohort had higher scoring for
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the last, the older for the first, and the more educated for the second, on average.
See Appendix A, Table 8A.1.
19. Women with nine years of education composed 16 percent of women in their 40s,
but only 3 percent of those in their late 20s to early 30s.  Therefore, the women
with nine years of education compose some share for the women with children in
the higher age group, but not so much so for women with small children.
20. The first income category is “less than 1 million yen,” which is near the upper
threshold below which income tax is not levied, as explained earlier.  The income
category increases by 1 million yen to more than 5 million yen.
21. The estimation was made correcting the censoring using Heckman (1976).
  Wage regression
   Selection equation for labor participation 
u1 ~ N(0,σ)
mu2 ~N(0,1)
Corr(u1, u2) = ρ
The likelihood for observation i is
The husband’s wage was estimated by OLS wage regression (see Appendix A),
and the estimated value was used for an explanatory variable in the women’s
wage regression.
22. According to the Ministry of Labor’s Survey on the Diversification of Workers of
1999, the average work week of part-time workers was 27.9 hours, while the aver-
age was 40.3 for full-time regular workers. 
23. Five thousand enterprises with 30 and more employees, excluding mining, con-
struction, education, welfare, and medicine were selected, with replies from 1,128
enterprises.  Among those enterprises that replied to the first survey, the survey
sheet for nonstandard workers was to be given to no less than 10 nonstandard
employees at the workplace.  The workers were to return the questionnaires by
mail.
24. The percentage is comparable to a larger survey, Survey on Part-Time Employees,
conducted by Ministry of Labor in 1995. Forty percent of short-work-week, part-
time workers intentionally adjusted their annual income to not exceed the limit of
tax-free income.  The percentage had risen by 5 percentage points from 1990.
Because of the general increase in the wage level, more part-time workers are
constrained by the non-tax income limit, which stayed about the same during the
period.
25. According to the Statistics Office’s Labor Force Special Survey, the population of
nonstandard workers in 2001 was 27 percent male and 73 percent female.  Among
females in nonstandard dependent employment, about 60 percent are married, if
the rate shown by Basic Employment Survey of 1997 is used.  In this year, among
female nonstandard workers, 62 percent were married.  This particular survey
1β + ui i iW X ′=
2γ + u 0i iZ ′ >
( ){ } ( ){ }2 1 1 22 2
d 0 d 1
( ,  ,  ,  )  1  / 1−
= =
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included 17 percent males and 28 percent nonmarried females.  Sixty-five percent
of females were married.
26. The estimation was made correcting the censoring using Heckman (1976). 
W1i = Xiβ1 + u1i   Wage of those who target income 
Ziγ1 + u2> 0    Selection equation for income targeting
where u1 ~ N(0,σ1)
u2 ~ N(0,1)
Corr(u1, u2) = ρ1
W2i = Xiβ2 + u3i  Wage of those who do not adjust work hours for the purpose of
tax  and other considerations
Ziγ2 + u4i > 0    Selection equation for not adjusting work hours 
where  u3 ~ N(0,σ2)
u4 ~ N(0,1)
 Corr(u3, u4) = ρ2
The likelihood of observation i is 
(j = 1, 2; j = 1, income targeting; j = 2, income nontargeting)
( ) ( ){ } ( ){ }2 2 2
0 1
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Remaining single one’s entire life 
is no good 0.503 –0.124 0.023 0.731
Couple should get married if they 
live together 0.634 –0.153 –0.181 0.542
Sex before marriage is all right if 
there is love –0.241 0.064 0.332 0.827
One should have an independent 
aim in life besides one’s family –0.165 0.283 0.269 0.820
Partly sacrificing one’s way of 
life or one’s trait is natural 
when married 0.258 –0.484 –0.027 0.699
Men should do market work and 
women domestic work 0.365 –0.465 –0.069 0.645
One should have children when 
married 0.570 –0.229 0.013 0.622
Not getting along is not enough 
reason for divorce 0.452 –0.256 –0.080 0.724
Marriage and love are different –0.084 0.020 0.219 0.945
NOTE: “Traditional values” place high value in marriage, in having children, and in
supporting division of work between the sexes. “Individualistic values” support one to
pursue one’s own objective in life and accept divorce if a couple does not get along.
“Openness in sex” supports sexual relationships before marriage, and also the value
that marriage and a love affair are different.
SOURCE: Nagase (1999).
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Table 8A.2 Husband’s Income Regression
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